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Pouring a Little Psychological Cold
Water on Online Dispute Resolution
Jean R. Sternlight*
ìEventually ODR may be the way we resolve most of the problems in our
lives, with algorithmic approaches even more trusted than human powered
resolutions.ê1
I. INTRODUCTION
I recently was privileged to be ìthe bad guyê in a panel discussion entitled
ìPromises and Pitfalls of Technology in Dispute Resolution.ê2 The other panelists3
were there to talk about the ìpromisesê of Online Dispute Resolution (ìODRê).
While their perspectives differed, my co–panelists suggested that ODR can
potentially make dispute resolution quicker, cheaper, and perhaps even more fair
and just.4 It is often said that ODR can enhance access to justice5 and that it can be
particularly useful to disputants who lack legal representation.6 My role as a
* Saltman Professor of Law, UNLV Boyd School of Law. I thank Alyson Carrel, Ethan Katsh,
David Larson, Carrie Menkel–Meadow, JanetMartinez, Lydia Nussbaum, Peter Reilly, Colin Rule, Amy
Schmitz, and Nancy Welsh for providing me with feedback. More thanks to my research assistants:
Tayler Bingham, Haley Jaramillo, and John McCormick–Huhn. I thank UNLV Boyd School of Law
librarian Youngwoo Ban for his able assistance throughout. I thank the editors at the Journal of Dispute
Resolution for their hard work.
1. Ethan Katsh & Colin Rule, What We Know and Need to Know About Online Dispute Resolution,
67 S.C. L. REV. 329, 343 (2016) (stating that, whereas ADR places value on resolving disputes face–to–
face, ODR processes rely on the intelligence and capabilities of machines and predict that most dispute
resolution processes will move online).
2. We presented at a session at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools in
New Orleans in January 2019. See generally THE ASSN OF AM. LAW SCH., https://www.aals.org/ (last
visited Nov. 20, 2019).
3. In New Orleans, I was accompanied by Alyson Carrel, Ethan Katsh, David Larson, Amy Schmitz,
Colin Rule (by video), and Janet Martinez.
4. The published version of my co–panelists remarks appear as follows: Alyson Carrel & Noam
Ebner, Mind the Gap: Bringing Technology to the Mediation Table, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2019);
David Allen Larson, Designing and Implementing a State Court ODR System: From Disappointment to
Celebration, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 77 (2019); Orna Rabinovich–Einy & Ethan Katsh, Blockchain and
the Inevitability of Disputes: The Role for Online Dispute Resolution, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL. 47 (2019);
Amy J. Schmitz & Colin Rule, Online Dispute Resolution for Smart Contracts, 2019 J. DISP. RESOL.
103 (2019); Janet Martinez, Designing Online Dispute Resolution, 2020 J. DISP. RESOL. 135 (2020).
5. Robert J. Condlin, Online Dispute Resolution: Stinky, Repugnant, or Drab, 18 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 717, 718–19 (2017) (stating that while ODR is frequently lauded for its ability to
increase ìaccess to justice,ê few commentators actually explain what they mean by this phrase or address
whether merely providing ìaccessê to disputants who might not be able to afford a more traditional
process is sufficient to provide ìjusticeê to those disputants).
6. Larson, supra note 4, at 92 (proposing a model in which ODR could be used in debt collection
cases both to provide information to often unrepresented consumers and to facilitate negotiation and
mediation between consumers and debt collection entities in those cases). Indeed, as Robert Condlin
observes, some believe one of the benefits of ODR is that it can eliminate the need for attorneys. See
Condlin, supra note 5, at 720 n.12 (ì[M]any ODR programs are designed to remove lawyers from the
dispute resolution process in the hope that disputing will be less frequent and less adversarial if that is
done.ê).
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panelist was to draw on psychology to take a more skeptical approach.7 In the end,
however, I do not think we should necessarily be making a binary choice between
ODR and other processes but, rather, determining how and when we can best weave
technology into various processes to resolve disputes most effectively and justly.
I agree ODR can sometimes be helpful.8 I am going to take a very big jump
and temporarily set aside my concerns that the public entities and private companies
that might establish ODR programs may have goals other than serving justice.9
Nevertheless, the idea expressed in the introductory quoteîthat we might trust
computers more than humans to resolve most of our problemsîraises some
important concerns I would like to address.10
The hesitations I want to raise about ODR stem from the fact that human
disputes are intimately connected to human psychology.11 Whereas others have
7. I confess to being something of a dispute resolution cynic. I believe Marc Galanter was right when
he opined almost fifty years ago that the wealthy and powerful will tend to take advantage of the poor
and weak in most dispute resolution systems. SeeMarc Galanter, Why the -Haves+ Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOCYREV. 95, 125 (1974); see also Carrie Menkel–
Meadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System Design? And What We Should [Not] Do
About It: Lessons from International and Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195, 204 (2009)
(observing that dispute system design is not a ìneutralê activity in that the designers ultimately report to
those who are requesting the design).
8. My co–panelists and others have discussed some of the potential benefits of ODR in prior work
as well. See, e.g., AMY J. SCHMITZ & COLIN RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 89–94 (2018) (discussing eight design
factors necessary to create an effective ODR system, including the need to provide customers ìfast and
easy resolutionsê in addition to providing ìmutual respect, with no attempt to confuse or mislead the
other sideê); ETHAN KATSH & ORNA RABINOVICH–EINY, DIGITAL JUSTICE: TECHNOLOGY AND THE
INTERNET OF DISPUTES 13 (2017) (discussing that as technology becomes a bigger aspect of our daily
lives, we will increasingly use it to facilitate discussions and resolve disputes); Ayelet Sela, The Effect
of Online Technologies on Dispute Resolution System Design: Antecedents, Current Trends and Future
Directions, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 633 (2017) (proposing a typological framework for evaluating
ODR systems); Katsh & Rule, supra note 1, at 330 (arguing that technology will be able to assist society
in resolving disagreements in ways in which we have typically been unable); Larson, supra note 4, at 93
(mentioning that, among other things, ODR can offer neutrality to conflict resolution, which is
oftentimes difficult to fully achieve).
9. At the risk of shocking the naïve, I observe that private and even public entities that establish ODR
processes may choose to emphasize goals other than justice. Private companies might, for example,
choose to impose a process that protects them from claims. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming
Employees: How American Employers are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal
Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309 (2015); Jean R. Sternlight,Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses
Prevent Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 89 (2012). On
the public side, it is easy to imagine that some lawmakers or courts might emphasize docket clearing
over ìrealê justice, however that might be defined. See, e.g., Carrel & Ebner, supra note 4, at 24
(expressing fear that court administrators may prefer a process that is ìfaster, cheaper, and off your
docketê even if that process does not offer the ìbestê dispute resolution in terms of other recognized
criteria). See also Menkel–Meadow, supra note 7, at 204.
10. It is important to note, however, that I highly respect and like the co–authors of this quote.
11. As is so often the case, I find myself thinking along similar lines as Professor Carrie Menkel–
Meadow. She suggests that while online dispute resolution may work well for small, simple disputes in
which forms can quickly be filled in and documents uploaded, these processes may be less effective for
those disputes requiring ìroom to brainstorm and create a different solution, give an apology, come to
understand someone elses perspective and improve, rather than just èresolve relations and disputes.ê
Carrie Menkel–Meadow, Is ODR ADR? Reflections of an ADR Founder from 15th ODR Conference,
The Hague, The Netherlands, 22æ23 May 2016, 3 INTL. J. ONLINE DISP. RESOL. 4, 7 (2016).
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critiqued ODR from policy12 or ethical13 perspectives, and while even staunch ODR
advocates have recognized that ODR is not necessarily ideal for every problem,14 I
believe it is critically important to use a psychological lens to evaluate all
approaches to human dispute resolution.15 Our human brains often function quite
differently than computers (and not just because brains work more slowly).16 For
example, when events happen, we may fail to perceive them entirely, perceive them
inaccurately, and/or remember them incorrectly. Moreover, our responses to events
are unpredictable, and we may not know what we want, at least in any meaningful
sense. Even when we do know what we want, we are not necessarily very good at
communicating with each other or making the judgments and decisions that might
best help us actually get what we want. If any system of dispute resolution is to
succeed, it must take into account this human psychology.17
The insight that human psychology is critical to dispute resolution leads to four
important conclusions. First, given that human psychology is at the core of many
civil disputes,18 to the extent we rely on ODR, we need to design ODR hardware
and software to take account of human psychology. Second, it may well be that
humans are better suited than computers to help us resolve many disputes. Third,
12. Condlin, supra note 5, at 737.
13. Scott J. Shackelford & Anjanette H. Raymond, Building the Virtual Courthouse: Ethical
Considerations for Design Implementation, and Regulation in the World of ODR, 2014 WIS. L. REV.
615, 617 (2014).
14. See, e.g., KATSH&RABINOVICH–EINY, supra note 8, at 180 (expressing great optimism about the
potential of ìdigital justiceê but also recognizing that ì[t]o be effective, digital justice will require
extensive monitoring of the impact of design choices on both efficiency and fairness.ê); SCHMITZ &
RULE, supra note 8, at 138 (recognizing that enthusiasm for online dispute resolution should not
overshadow focus on justice and ethics); Carrel & Ebner, supra note 4, at 42 (mentioning that while
technology has a multitude of benefits, there are impacts ìof private settlement on weak, marginalized,
and economically disadvantaged populations.ê).
15. I certainly do not pretend to be the first person to point out that psychology is relevant to dispute
system design. Major software designers such as Amazon, Google, Facebook, and eBay are already
employing lots of psychologists, some of whom, no doubt, focus on dispute resolution. I hope, however,
that this Article will offer a helpful framework and reminder as we further explore the potential of ODR.
16. See infra note 145 (discussing work of Daniel Kahneman). While some may be tempted to say
that human brains suffer from various ìbiasesê or ìflawsê and thus are deficient compared to computers,
I believe the analysis is far more complex. In short, I dont think that computers functioning is
necessarily superior as the words ìbiasê or ìflawê imply but, rather, just different. After all, our human
information processing has served us very well for millennia. There can be advantages, for example, to
not remembering every insult one has received, or to being overly optimistic about the future. See David
Robson, The Blessing and Curse of Those Who Never Forget, BBC: FUTURE (Jan. 26, 2016), http://
www.bbc.com/future/story/20160125-the-blessing-and-curse-of-the-people-who-never-forget (stating
that people with highly superior autobiographical memory (ìHSAMê) can have difficulty getting over
pain and regret: ìIt can be very hard to forget embarrassing moments. You cant turn that stream of
memories off, no matter how hard you try.ê); Lesley Stahl, The Gift of Endless Memory, CBS: 60
MINUTES (Dec. 16, 2010), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-gift-of-endless-memory/ (stating that
people with HSAM describe it as ìisolatingê and are ìhaunted by a never–ending stream of memoryê).
17. I am not trying to discuss every aspect of human psychology that is important to dispute resolution
but, rather, to highlight a few of the most important areas.
18. Some have also thought to use ODR for criminal matters, such as traffic disputes or outstanding
warrants, but that raises a host of policy and Constitutional issues that are beyond the scope of this
Article. See, e.g., Colin Rule, How ODR Can Benefit Three Criminal Case Types, TYLER TECHS. (June
12, 2019) https://www.tylertech.com/resources/blog-articles/how-odr-can-benefit-three-criminal-case-
types (discussing the potential of using ODR for moving vehicle violations, victim-offender resolution,
and plea bargaining); JOINT TECH. COMM., CASE STUDIES IN ODR FOR COURTS: A VIEW FROM THE
FRONT LINES (Nov. 2017), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/About%20Us/Committees/JTC/J
TC%20Resource%20Bulletins/2017-12-18%20ODR%20case%20studies%20revised.ashx (discussing
Michigans experience using ODR for outstanding warrants and in civil traffic court).
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we must be imaginative in deciding whether and how to incorporate technology into
dispute resolution. The psychological approach will help us see that the choice of
a dispute resolution approach should not be based merely on the dollar value at
stake, the complexity of disputes, nor whether disputants have attorneys, but on how
disputants are likely viewing and communicating about their issues. We need to
think like clients. At the same time, we must be open to the possibility that now or
in the future, computers, robots, and artificial intelligence may help us deal with our
human psychology. Fourth, we must address these issues empirically. Rather than
making assumptions about how best to handle psychological issues, we should test
and evaluate both online and in–person approaches to dispute resolution. We each
may have our gut feelings about what will work best, and these feelings may be
informed by personal experiences, but it is imperative that we test our instincts
using empirical tools.19
I do not see a psychological approach as inconsistent with a technological
approach but, rather, believe the two must be integrated. If technology is going to
help resolve human disputes, it must be tailored to human psychology. Thus, as we
become more reliant on technology, it will be increasingly important for those
involved with dispute resolution to bolster their ability to deal with the human
psyche.20 In light of our growing reliance on technology, I believe we need to
enhance the human side of law school curriculum,21 just as artificial intelligence
experts have emphasized the need to increasingly value people–skills as we develop
our technical expertise in other realms.22
In the remainder of this Article, I will focus on four important psychological
aspects of disputes and consider the likely implications of this psychology for ODR.
After a discussion of the limitations of the term ìOnline Dispute Resolutionê in
Section II, Section III(A) examines the psychology of perception and memory;
Section III(B) considers the psychology of human wants; Section III(C) looks at the
19. See generally ROBERTM.LAWLESS, JENNIFERK. ROBBENNOLT, & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL
METHODS IN LAW (2d ed. 2016) (discussing importance of empirical analysis from various
methodological traditions and providing guidance on how to conduct and understand empirical work).
20. See, e.g., Alyson Carrel, Legal Intelligence Through Artificial Intelligence Requires Emotional
Intelligence: A New Competency Model for the 21st Century Legal Professional, 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1153, 1155 (2019); Milan Markovic, Rise of the Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325, 346 (2019)
(contending that because lawyers are highly educated professionals whose work involves problem–
solving, intuition, creation, persuasion, and communication, their work cannot all be easily automated);
Melissa Love Koenig, Julie A. Oseid, & Amy Vorenberg, Ok, Google, Will Artificial Intelligence
Replace Human Lawyering?, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 1269 (2019).
21. Carrel, supra note 20, at 1154 (advocating that attorneys should be trained using a ìDelta Modelê
that ìrecognizes the need for lawyers to have deep legal knowledge and skills as well as an understanding
of data and technology, but also the need for emotional intelligence in decision–making and problem–
solving.ê).
22. See, e.g., THOMAS W. MALONE, SUPERMINDS: THE SURPRISING POWER OF PEOPLE AND
COMPUTERS THINKING TOGETHER 15 (2018) (Malone, the founding director of the MIT Center for
Collective Intelligence, argues that because humans have interpersonal and communication skills that
computers do not, it will be more effective to design systems where machines and humans work together
rather than to endeavor to replace humans with machines); see also The Berkman Klein Ctr. for Internet
& Socy, Barbara Grosz: Designing AI to Complement Humanity, YOUTUBE (Jan. 10, 2017), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=a7HCRFK3cHI (interviewing with Berkeley Klein Center for Internet &
Society); UCI Dept of Comput. Sci. Seminar, From the Turing Test to Smart Partners–Barbara Grosz,
Harvard Univ., YOUTUBE (May 19, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pEfilSxMK-k (lecturing
at UC Irvine); see also PAULR. DAUGHERTY&H. JAMESWILSON, HUMAN + MACHINE: REIMAGINING
WORK IN THEAGE OFAI 80 (2018) (finding that firms achieved the greatest performance improvements
when humans and machines worked together).
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psychology of communication; and Section III(D) discusses judgment and
decision–making. While it would be possible to consider other aspects of human
psychology as well, looking at these four examples will help us begin to consider
why human psychology is so important to an analysis of ODR. Then, in Section
IV, I show how all these aspects of psychology can come together in a family
dispute.
II. PROBLEMSWITH THE TERM ìODRê
Before getting into the details of my psychology–based argument, I believe it
is important to discuss the problems I see with the term ìODRê itself. My concern
is not that the acronym calls to mind the term ìodor,ê as some have suggested.23
Really, I have a problem with any term that would join together all technologically–
assisted forms of dispute resolution. About twenty years ago, I wrote an article
arguing that the term ìADRê was not particularly useful.24 I asserted that because
various types of ADR (e.g., arbitration, mediation, and negotiation) are so different
from one another, and because arbitration has a lot more in common with litigation
than it does with mediation or negotiation, I could not see much benefit in lumping
all those non–litigation processes together into a single category.25 The same can
be said about the diversity in format and application of the many technologically–
assisted dispute resolution processes employed todayîthe term ìODRê is simply
too broad to be useful.26
I have heard Colin Rule, whom I greatly respect, define ODR as
ìtechnologically assisted dispute resolution.ê27 But under this definition, does ODR
not swallow up absolutely every form of dispute resolution?28 It potentially
includes virtually all arbitration, negotiation, mediation, and also litigation. After
all, when disputants or their attorneys use telephones or emails or texts or
microphones or maybe even mechanical pencils in connection with negotiation,
mediation, litigation, or arbitration, are they not using ìODRê if, as that definition
suggests, the only requirement is that the resolution be ìtechnologically assistedê?
Even if one defines ODR in a much more limited way, to perhaps mean
resolving disputes with the help of computers or the internet, the term is still
23. Indeed, I had never thought about this until my co–panelist Ethan Katsh, rightly called the ìfather
of the field,ê pointed it out in his response to some of my comments in New Orleans. A better punster
than I, however, has noted the ìodorê issue. See Condlin, supra note 5, at 717.
24. Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument That the Term -ADR+
Has Begun to Outlive its Usefulness, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 97 (2000).
25. Id. at 104–06, 110.
26. My co–panelists Alyson Carrel and Noam Ebner make a similar point in a different way when
they observe that it is far different to use technology to assist in–person mediation than it is to use
technology in place of in–person mediation. See Carrel & Ebner, supra note 4; see also A.B.A. TASK
FORCE ONELEC. COMMERCE&ALT. DISPUTERESOLUTION, Addressing Disputes in Elec. Commerce 15
(2002), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/_migrated/dispute/documents/FinalReport1028
02.authcheckdam.pdf (observing that the term ODR ìmay convey different things to different people.ê).
27. See, e.g., Colin Rule, Is ODR ADR?, 3 INTL. J. ONLINE DISP. RESOL. 8, 8 (2016) (arguing that
ODR includes use of e–mail, teleconferences, calendar invitations, and videoconferencing, and defining
ODR as ìthe use of information and communications technologies to help parties resolve their
disputes.ê).
28. See Carrel & Ebner, supra note 4, at 7 (observing that ìpractitioners and academics alike are quick
to conflate anything to do with technology in mediation with ODRê and then either regard it all
enthusiastically or condemn it all harshly).
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extremely broad.29 In particular, it covers both using computers as adjudicators and
also to aid in the negotiation or mediation of disputes.30 As an ìadjudicator,ê
computers can potentially take the role that a judge, arbitrator, boss, or parent may
fill and produce a decision that will resolve a dispute.31 That is, disputants can file
complaints and respond to those complaints online, and a computer can be
programmed to make a decision. Alternatively, as a negotiation or mediation aid,
computers can help disputants exchange or acquire perspectives or information that
might help them resolve their conflicts.32 Again, claims can be filed online, but
here the computer can offer prompts to claimants or respondents to help them
connect with one another or gain insights into their situation. In this context, some
find it useful to call technology a ìfourth partyê that can either assist or, perhaps,
take the place of a third party neutral, but the breadth of this phrase also illustrates
the definitional problem at issue.33
ODR also covers the use of computers or other sophisticated technology in a
broad range of subject areas. For example, our panel at the conference discussed
the resolution of consumer disputes using written exchanges aided by computer
modules,34 the use of court–connected ODR to handle credit card debt claims,35 the
use of blind bidding tools or algorithms to resolve personal injury or other
disputes,36 ìsmart contractsê37 devised to resolve certain disputes without
immediate human intervention, and the use of online chat rooms or similar
29. Professor Condlin has written a detailed description of some of the many forms of ODR. Condlin,
supra note 5, at 724–33.
30. Of course, computers do not literally do anything on their own; they are directed by the humans
who design the technology and softwareîwe hope so, at least. See, e.g., John Markoff, Scientists Worry
Machines May Outsmart Man, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/
science/26robot.html. Many movies have explored the possibility that artificial intelligence might come
to control or harm humans. See, e.g., TERMINATOR GENISYS (Paramount Pictures 2015) (examining
fallout from when Skynet, a computer program designed to automate missile defense, destroyed most of
human world); 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer 1968) (recounting problems that
occur when rocket computer HAL ceases to accept human direction).
31. Katsh & Rule, supra note 1, at 330–31 (discussing that computers cannot only assist in the process
of dispute resolution itself, but also make it possible to glean data on disputing patterns and behaviors
more effectively than a human could); Larson, supra note 4, at 80 (discussing the online technology
Ohio uses to resolve taxpayer disputes); see also David Allen Larson, Artificial Intelligence: Robots,
Avatars and the Demise of the Human Mediator, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 105, 105 (2010)
(discussing that artificial intelligence can now practically assume all the responsibilities that ADR
practitioners currently perform); Chris Johnston, Artificial Intelligence )Judge’ Developed by UCL
Computer Scientists, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/
oct/24/artificial-intelligence-judge-university-college-london-computer-scientists.
32. Carrel & Ebner, supra note 4, at 26 (describing the role of the ìfourth partyê computer); see also
Horacio Falcão, Can Computers Negotiate? WinæWin Negotiations in a Virtual World, FORBES (Nov.
19, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insead/2013/11/19/can-computers-negotiate-win-win-negotiati
ons-in-a-virtual-world/#1eb67fac1d15.
33. See, e.g., Katsh & Rule, supra note 1, at 331 (citing ETHAN KATSH & JANET RIVKIN, ONLINE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: RESOLVINGCONFLICTS IN CYBERSPACE 93 (John Wiley ed., 2001)).
34. My co–panelists have played key roles in furthering the use of technology with on–line sellers
such as eBay and with courts. See, e.g., Schmitz & Rule, supra note 4, at 117; Larson, supra note 4, at
77.
35. Larson, supra note 4.
36. See KATSH & RABINOVICH–EINY, supra note 8, at 35–36, 48 (describing two of these blind
bidding processes called Cybersettle and Smartsettle and Amazons algorithm for deciding whether to
immediately credit consumers who complain about unreceived or defective items); see also
SMARTSETTLE BEYOND WIN–WIN, https://smartsettle.com/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2019). See generally
KATSH& RIVKIN, supra note 33 (describing some of the earliest online attempts).
37. Rabinovich–Einy & Katsh, supra note 4, at 51; Schmitz & Rule, supra note 4, at 103.
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approaches to facilitate real time mediations between persons who may be located
far away from one another.38 ODR includes the use of technology to resolve
disputes that arose through online commerce39 or other interactions, but can also
cover the use of technology to resolve disputes that arose off–line, involving
families, business deals, civil rights, debt collection, or any other matters.40
Courts,41 private mediators, and private arbitrators are increasingly using online
approaches to handle arguments in court,42 mediations,43 and arbitrations.44 For
example, the British Columbia Civil Resolution Tribunal (ìCRTê), Canadas first
online tribunal, resolves a range of issues, including small claims, condominium
disputes, and motor vehicle injuries.45 The CRT provides free legal information to
38. Carrel & Ebner, supra note 4, at 26–34. Carrell and Ebner concur with my point that it is unwise
to conflate all uses of technology in the dispute resolution context with ODR. They urge that we spend
more time thinking about how technology can be used to assist traditional mediation rather than focus
most of our technological energy on moving disputes entirely online. Id. at 7.
39. Stephen Ware, DomainæName Arbitration in the ArbitrationæLaw Context: Consent to, and
Fairness in, the UDRP, 6 J. SMALL&EMERGINGBUS. 145, 160 (2002) (discussing ICANN arbitration);
Katsh & Rule, supra note 1, at 333–34, 337–38 (discussing both eBays use of online dispute resolution
and ìonline property tax assessment appealsê); Rachel Erani, Amazon, Arbitration, & Customer
Vindication, J. HIGH TECH. L. BLOG (Nov. 14, 2018), https://sites.suffolk.edu/jhtl/2018/11/14/amazon-
arbitration-and-customer-vindication/ (providing an overview of Amazons online dispute resolution
processes).
40. KATSH & RABINOVICH–EINY, supra note 8, at 13; Larson, supra note 4, at 92 (discussing the
design of an ODR system to help New York courts resolve credit card debt claims). For a good
discussion of ODR uses throughout the world, see generally Anjanette H. Raymond & Scott J.
Shackelford, Technology, Ethics and Access to Justice: Should an Algorithm Be Deciding Your Case?,
35 MICH. J. INTL L. 485 (2014).
41. Larson, supra note 4, at 77; see also John Nevin, Michigan Supreme Court Announces
Groundbreaking MIæResolve Online Mediation Program, MICH. COURTS NEWS RELEASE (Aug. 7,
2019), https://courts.michigan.gov/News-Events/press_releases/Documents/Statewide%20Media%20
Release%20ODR.pdf (discussing a new online service intended to resolve disputes involving small
claims, general civil, or landlord–tenant matters); Civil Justice Council Online Dispute Resolution
Advisory Grp., Online Dispute Resolution for Low Value Civil Claims, COURTS & TRIBUNALS
JUDICIARY (2015), https://www.judiciary.uk/publications/online-dispute-resolution-for-low-value-civil-
claims-2/ (recommending use of online dispute resolution programs for English courts).
42. See generally Carolyn McKay, Video Links from Prison: Court -Appearance+ within Carceral
Space, 14 L. CULTURE & HUMAN. 242 (2018). For a discussion on the potential for ADR in different
court settings, see Larson, supra note 4; Brian A. Pappas, Online Court: Online Dispute Resolution &
The Future of Small Claims, 12 UCLA J. L. TECH. 1, 16 (2008).
43. Clark County Court Uses New Technology from Tyler to Resolve Disputes Online, BUS. WIRE
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180417005157/en/Clark-County-Court-
New-Technology-Tyler-Resolve (discussing the use of online dispute resolution technology to assist in
divorce mediations); see also Larson, supra note 4, at 85, 92 (discussing the ability to use ODR to aid in
consumer debt dispute mediations); Martin Gramatikov & Laura Klaming, Getting Divorced Online:
Procedural and Outcome Justice in Online Divorce Mediation, 14 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 97, 120 (2012);
Sabine Braun, Videoconferencing as a Tool for Bilingual Mediation, UNDERSTANDING JUST. PROJECT
194 (2016).
44. Rabinovich–Einy & Katsh, supra note 4, at 59 (discussing ìKleros,ê the arbitration system ìmeant
to address smart contract–related disputes.ê); see, e.g., Colin Rule & Indu Sen, Online Dispute
Resolution and Ombuds: Bringing Technology to the Table, 8 J. INTLOMBUDSMANASSN 70, 73 (2015)
(discussing how availability of ìSkypeê and ìGoogle Hangoutsê provides opportunities for decreased
costs and increased engagement in online disputes); Dafna Lavi, Three Is Not a Crowd: Online
MediationæArbitration in Business to Consumer Internet Disputes, 37 U. PA. J. INTLL. 871, 880 (2016).
See generally MAUD PIERS & CHRISTIAN ASCHAUER, ARBITRATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE: THE BRAVE
NEWWORLD OFARBITRATION (2018).
45. CIV. RESOLUTION TRIBUNAL, https://civilresolutionbc.ca/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2019) (describing
the British Columbia Civil Resolution Tribunal, Canadas first online tribunal, which handles issues
including car accident injuries, small claims, and housing disputes).
8 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2020
users,46 helps users reach negotiated resolutions,47 and ultimately issues decisions
in the event that negotiation does not succeed.48
The differences among the ODR processes described above far overwhelm any
similarities.49 If one seeks to analyze the pros and cons of any of these processes
from the perspectives of psychology, cost, access to justice, transparency, or any
other angle, one will get different results for each process and context. That is, one
may love one form of ìODRê for a particular situation but hate another. Because
using the term ìODRê obscures rather than aids analysis, we should cease to use
the phrase.50 This problem cannot be solved by using a different term, such as
ìTechnology Assisted Dispute Resolutionê51 or ìTechnology Mediated Dispute
Resolution.ê52 My critique is not that the wrong term is being used but, rather, that
it is not useful to group so many disparate processes under any single term.
Nonetheless, because the term is so frequently used, and because it was used by my
friends, the organizers of the symposium, and in the panel discussion, I will set aside
my definitional crankiness and do my best to get down to even more important
business.
III. HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY ANDDISPUTERESOLUTION
Human psychology impacts dispute resolution in many ways. Below, I focus
on perception andmemory, the challenges humans face in assessing what they want,
communication, and judgment and decision making. Each section first briefly
discusses the particular psychological phenomenon and then examines how that
psychology impacts dispute resolution.
A. Perception and Memory of Events
1. The Psychology of Human Perception and Memory
While humans are quite good at using our senses to perceive our surrounding
environment, we miss a lot and sometimes perceive things and events
inaccurately.53 We may be looking down instead of up, or focused on the
foreground instead of the background.54 Famous studied examples include failing




49. Martinez, supra note 4.
50. Although I make this proposal sincerely, I also recognize that my advocacy will almost certainly
fail, as it did when I tried to move our field away from using the term ìADR.ê
51. Larson, supra note 31, at 155.
52. See generally David Allen Larson, Technology Mediated Dispute Resolution (TMDR):
Opportunities and Dangers, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 213 (2006).
53. See JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS:
UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISION MAKING 7–27
(2012).
54. Interestingly, those with ADD or ADHD may sometimes perceive things that those of us who are
ìneurotypicalê would miss, due to our ability to screen out ìirrelevantê stimuli. William Dodson,
Uncomfortable Truths About the ADHD Nervous System, ADDITUDE (July 2, 2019), https://www.addit
udemag.com/adhd-in-adults-nervous-system/.
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to observe gorillas appearing in videos,55 failing to observe a gorilla in an MRI
readout,56 or failing to observe a crime in progress.57 Magicians are masters at
taking advantage of humans limited perception.58 Moreover, our increasing focus
on our phones only adds to our perceptive issues, as illustrated by the rapidly
escalating number of pedestrian accidents.59 Yet, despite our clear limits, we tend
to think our perceptive capabilities are better than they are. Psychologists call our
weakness in noticing changes that take place in our environment ìchange
blindness.ê60
When it comes to categorizing the information we do take in, human perception
is impacted by our prior knowledgeîwhat psychologists call ìschema,ê ìscripts,ê
and ìstereotypes.ê61 Often this prior information is extremely helpful (e.g.,
allowing us to identify a large moving object such as a car, even though we have
not seen that exact car before).62 Sometimes, however, our prior knowledge may
lead us astray. We may, for example, perceive that persons of a certain race or
ethnicity are more likely to be holding a gun than a harmless object,63 perceive that
demonstrators have overstepped appropriate limits depending on whether or not the
55. ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 7–14; Daniel Simon & Christopher Cabris,
Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events, 28 PERCEPTION 1059,
1068 (1999).
56. CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE GORILLA: AND OTHER WAYS OUR
INTUITION DECEIVESUS 35 (2010).
57. Deborah Davis et al., -Unconscious Transference+ Can Be an Instance of -Change Blindness+,
22 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 605, 610 (2008); see also Graham Davies & Sarah Hine, Change
Blindness and Eyewitness Testimony, 141 J. PSYCHOL. 423, 433 (2007). See generally Kally J. Nelson
et al., Change Blindness Can Cause Mistaken Eyewitness Identification, 16 LEGAL& CRIMINOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 62 (2011).
58. Cyril Thomas et al., Does Magic Offer a Cryptozoology Ground for Psychology?, 19 REV. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 117, 117 (2015) (ìAmong the procedures that magicians use to trick the audience, many call
upon precise knowledge of the human mind and its limitations . . . [M]agicians manipulate spectators
perception by relying on intuitive knowledge about the rules governing human cognition.ê).
59. See Alva O. Ferdinand, Technology is Better Than Ever/But Thousands of Americans Still Die
in Car Crashes Every Year, THE CONVERSATION (May 1, 2018, 6:40 AM); Fernando A. Wilson & Jim
P. Stimpson, Trends in Fatalities from Distracted Driving in the U.S., 1999æ2008, 100 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 2213, 2213 (2010).
60. See generally Daniel T. Levin et al., Change Blindness Blindness: The Metacognitive Error of
Overestimating ChangeæDetection Ability, 7 VISUAL COGNITION 397 (2000) (introducing the term
ìchange blindness blindnessê along with two experiments providing support for this metacognitive
error); Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, What People Believe About How Memory Works: A
Representative Survey of the U.S. Population, 6 PLOS ONE 1, 3–6 (2011).
61. ROBBENNOLT& STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 12.
62. Indeed, as programmers are working to provide such knowledge to autonomous vehicles, we have
seen that its absence can be deadly. An autonomous car in Arizona killed a bicyclist because even though
it perceived an object in the road, it did not properly characterize the object as a person walking their
bicycle. Autonomous Car Crashes: Who/Or What/Is to Blame?, WHARTON: UNIV.OF PENN. (Apr. 6,
2018), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/automated-car-accidents/.
63. B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: SplitæSecond Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping, 15
PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287–89 (2006); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Targets of Discrimination: Effects of
Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399, 404–05 (2003).
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perceiver holds political views in sync with the demonstrator,64 or perceive that
referees in a sporting event favor the opposing team.65
Human perception is also impacted by our emotions. For example, we are more
likely to see things in a positive way when we are otherwise in a goodmood.66 Also,
we may perceive events in light of our own self–image and aspirations. If
something bad happens, we may well perceive that it was caused by someone else,
or by environmental factors, rather than by our ownmissteps.67 Yet, while emotions
are clearly important, and while we can be good at identifying emotions based on
small differences in facial expressions,68 we are not as good as we think at
perceiving others emotions.69 Nor are we as good as we think at determining
whether others are lying.70 Malcolm Gladwell explores these and other issues in
depth in his new book, Talking to Strangers.71
In addition to having imperfect perceptive capabilities, humans also have
imperfect memories. No matter how accurately we may perceive events, our
memories often both fade72 and change over time.73 These memory changes are not
random but can be influenced by subsequent events. For example, humans will
often remember things in ways that put themselves in a more positive light and
64. Dan M. Kahan et al., They Saw a Protest: Cognitive Illiberalism and the SpeechæConduct
Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 862, 883–85, 900 (2012); see alsoMichael E. Miller, Viral Standoff
Between a Tribal Elder and a High Schooler is More Complicated Than it First Seemed , WASH. POST
(Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/picture-of-the-conflict-on-the-
mall-comes-into-clearer-focus/2019/01/20/c078f092-1ceb-11e9-9145-3f74070bbdb9_story.html?nored
irect=on&utm_term=.cf5336823aee (discussing how preconceptions affected the publics interpretation
of video showing conflict between white high school students, an older Native American, and African–
American protesters at the Lincoln Memorial).
65. Albert H. Harsdorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 129, 130–32 (1954).
66. See, e.g., George Loewenstein & Jennifer Lerner, The Role of Affect in Decision Making, in
HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 619, 619 (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003).
67. Edward E. Jones & Richard E. Nisbett, The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the
Causes of Behavior, in ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 82 (Edward E. Jones et
al. eds., 1971) (introducing the actor–observer effect); see also Richard E. Nisbett, Behavior as Seen by
the Actor and as Seen by the Observer, 27 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 154, 163 (1973) (providing
results for three studies on the actor–observer effect).
68. See, e.g., PAUL EKMAN, EMOTIONS REVEALED: RECOGNIZING FACESAND FEELINGS TO IMPROVE
COMMUNICATION AND EMOTIONAL LIFE 56æ58 (2d ed. 2003); Randall A. Gordon et al., NonæVerbal
Behaviour as Communication: Approaches, Issues, and Research, in THE HANDBOOK OF
COMMUNICATION SKILLS 73, 85 (Owen Hargie ed., 2006); MARK L. KNAPP & JUDITH A. HALL,
NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION IN HUMAN INTERACTION 138–42 (6th ed. 2005).
69. See Thomas Gilovich et al., The Illusion of Transparency: Biased Assessments of Others’ Ability
to Read One’s Emotional States, 75 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 332, 343 (1998) (investigating the
illusion of transparency); see also MALCOLM GLADWELL, TALKING TO STRANGERS (2019) (providing
numerous real–world examples of how we are poor at understanding each other or detecting when others
are lying).
70. Bella M. DePaulo et al., The AccuracyæConfidence Correlation in the Detection of Deception, 1
J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 346, 346 (1997); see also Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo,
Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 214, 230 (2006) (finding a grand
mean of 54% lie–truth discrimination rate through a meta–analysis).
71. GLADWELL, supra note 69.
72. DANIELL. SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINSOFMEMORY: HOWTHEMIND FORGETS AND REMEMBERS
15–16 (2001).
73. Heike Schmolck, Elizabeth A. Buffalo, & Larry R. Squire, Memory Distortions Develop Over
Time: Recollections of the O.J. Simpson Trial After 15 and 32 Months, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 39, 43–44
(2000); William Hirst et al., A TenæYear FollowæUp of a Study of Memory for the Attack of September
11, 2001: Flashbulb Memories and Memories for Flashbulb Events, 144 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.
604, 619–21 (2015).
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remember rosier aspects of things when they are in a good mood.74 Further, human
memories can be changed by the way in which questions are asked,75 or by what
pictures they are shown.76 Yet, as with perception, we tend to have high opinions
of the accuracy of our own memories.77
2. How Perception and Memory Impact Dispute Resolution
The fact that human perception and memory are limited, impacted by emotion,
and often self–serving, is very important for both adjudicative and negotiated
dispute resolution. As this psychology has significantly different implications for
the two types of dispute resolution, I will discuss them separately.
If an adjudicator, human or otherwise, depends on humans reports of what
happened, that adjudicator may well be relying on flawed facts. Even when humans
try to be truthful about their experiences,78 they are likely to have perceived and
remembered facts imperfectly.79 Therefore, we should hesitate to have computers
or any other purported neutral resolve disputes based merely on contested facts
presented by disputants.80 While finding the truth is challenging for any
adjudicator, human or otherwise, at least a human adjudicator can seek to separate
fact from fiction and weigh competing evidence considering alternative
perspectives. It is harder to see how a computer adjudicator, relying merely on
disputants differing versions of the facts, will spit out a just solution. Nor can one
assume that photographs or other documents submitted by a disputant will resolve
all issues, as documents can be interpreted in various ways and can even be faked.81
Thus, if online adjudication is based on disputants factual assertions, it may well
be based on false facts.82
The psychology of perception and memory is also very important to the extent
disputants seek to resolve their issues through negotiation or mediation. In this
context it can be extremely helpful for the disputants to come to realize that their
74. Michael Dufner et al., SelfæEnhancement and Psychological Adjustment: A MetaæAnalytic
Review, 23 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 48, 48–53, 58–60 (2019) (reviewing how a persons self–
enhancement influences their personal and interpersonal adjustment); Terence R. Mitchell et al.,
Temporal Adjustments in the Evaluation of Events: The -Rosy View+, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 421, 428, 434, 442 (1997).
75. Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of
the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING&VERBAL BEHAV. 585, 588
(1974).
76. For example, participants were led to believe they had shaken hands with Bugs Bunny at Disney,
though Bugs Bunny is not a Disney character. Kathryn A. Braun, Rhiannon Ellis, & Elizabeth F. Loftus,
Make My Memory: How Advertising Can Change Our Memories of the Past, 19 PSYCHOL. MKT. 1, 13–
18 (2002) (experiment two).
77. Simons & Chabris, supra note 60, at 5.
78. Of course, humans may well lie about events as well, which also creates adjudication challenges.
Humans are not very good at telling when others are lying. ROBBENNOLT& STERNLIGHT, supra note
53, at 153–57. To date, we also lack technology that can reliably detect lies. Jean R. Sternlight, Justice
in a Brave New World?, 52 U. CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
79. See generally Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Malleability of Human Memory: Information Introduced
After We View an Incident Can Transform Memory, 67 AM. SCIENTIST 312 (1979) (reviewing seminal
findings on how false information can supplement a persons memory).
80. Needless to say, adjudication is easier when the relevant facts are not contested.
81. Sternlight, supra note 78; see also Robert Chesney & Danielle Keats Citron, Deep Fakes: A
Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1753 (2019).
82. The implications of psychology for the adjudicators themselves will be discussed infra when we
look at judgment and decision–making.
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view of the dispute is not uniquely correct.83 Many disputes arise and linger because
of misunderstandings based on differing perceptions and memories of common
events. If disputants can come to recognize that it is possible for multiple
interpretations of the facts to coexist, perhaps disputants will be able to resolve their
issues or forgive one another and move on to a better future relationship. When we
are sure someone else deliberately harmed or insulted us, we may want to insist on
revenge, or at least a day in court or substantial compensation.84 If we can, however,
somehow come to understand that we, too, were part of the problem, or that the bad
thing that happened may not have been deliberate or even anyones fault, resolution
comes easier.
Helping disputants come to the realization that their version of the facts may
be just one potential version, or even wrong altogether, is often the work of
therapists, lawyers, mediators, and friends. Indeed, many see this insight as central
to the role of mediators.85 In order to help disputants see that there is likely more
than one side to every story, mediators use techniques including role reversal,
reframing, rhetorical questioning, and direct questions to help parties begin to shift
their perceptions of a dispute.86 Lawyers can use similar techniques to help their
clients understand that their assumptions and facts may have been wrong, that harm
may have been unintended, and that relationships can be mended.87
However, it is often not easy to convince people to set aside their assumptions
and beliefs about facts and one another. While we are quite ready to believe that
others’ perceptions and memories are flawed, it is much harder for most people to
accept that their own are equally imperfect.88 Merely telling a person that their own
perception or memory may be flawed is not likely to change that persons mind.89
Moreover, whereas one might assume that data would cure our perceptual and
83. For considerations of how perspective–taking plays a role in the attorney–client dynamic, see
ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 261. I do not mean to suggest that lawyers or judges
are immune to these or other biases. They are not. See, e.g., RANDALL KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND
WRONG: THE POWER OF EFFECTIVE DECISIONMAKING FORATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS 283–307 (2010)
(discussing that lawyers are impacted by numerous cognitive biases and heuristics); Chris Guthrie,
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 816
(2001) (reporting on empirical research showing federal magistrate judges were subject to cognitive
illusions including anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, inverse fallacy, and egocentric bias).
84. See Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1400 (2003)
(ì[S]ome aspects of modern compensatory remedies suggest that the law still provides an outlet for the
impulse toward personal revenge.ê).
85. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel–Meadow, The Trouble With the Adversary System in a Postmodern,
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 22 (1996); see also Gary Friedman & Jack
Himmelstein, Resolving Conflict Together: The UnderstandingæBased Model of Mediation, 2006 J.
DISP. RESOL. 523 (2006) (emphasizing the importance of disputants coming to understand one anothers
perspectives).
86. See, e.g., James H. Stark & Douglas N. Frenkel, Changing Minds: The Work of Mediators and
Empirical Studies of Persuasion, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 263, 273–74, 297–99 (2013)
(examining empirical research underlying these and other persuasion techniques).
87. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt,Good Lawyers Should be Good Psychologists:
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J.ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 527–31, 538–48
(2008).
88. See, e.g., DAVID DUNNING, SELF–INSIGHT: ROADBLOCKS AND DETOURS ON THE PATH TO
KNOWING THYSELF 2–9 (2005); Emily Pronin, The Introspection Illusion, 41 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 10–12 (2009).
89. TALI SHAROT, THE INFLUENTIAL MIND: WHAT THE BRAIN REVEALS ABOUT OUR POWER TO
CHANGEOTHERS 15 (2017); see also Stark & Frenkel, supra note 86 (discussing a variety of persuasive
techniques that can be useful to mediators).
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memory errors, it turns out that humans are extremely good at interpreting data to
support their preexisting views. As one psychologist puts it, ì[D]ata has only a
limited capacity to alter the strong opinions of others. Established beliefs can be
extremely resistant to change, even when scientific evidence is provided to
undermine those beliefs.ê90
The key to changing minds and helping people appreciate others perspectives
turns out to be connected to innately human factors such as emotion, liking,
empathy, rapport, and means of communication.91 When we make strong human
connections we are better able to rethink our positions and change our minds.92
Effective communication and persuasion turns not only on providing information,
but also on listening, and it potentially involves body language and intonation as
well as words.93 We have likely all sat with people who are masters at helping us
or others open our respective minds to alternative views.
By contrast, it is difficult for many of us to imagine that a computer or robot
would help a person gain that insight. While a computer could certainly inform a
person that their perception may have been erroneous or their memory flawed, it is
hard to imagine computers employing the interpersonal skills necessary to help a
person come to such realizations. Just receiving a message from a computer (or
reading in a book or article) that ones perception or memory may have been flawed
is often not enough to shake a person out of their certainty that their view is the right
view.94 Indeed, such a missive could even backfire and lead a person to defensively
lock into their original position.95
Is it totally inconceivable that robots or avatars could ever generate the empathy
and rapport needed to help humans rethink their positions? Maybe not. David
Larson, who is perhaps the most optimistic legal commentator on this front,
contends that robots and avatars may one day be as good or better than humans in
helping humans process difficult issues and advance their understanding.96 In
particular, pointing to the fact that robots are already being employed as
companions and used in the health sciences to obtain or convey embarrassing
information, Larson argues that we should not assume robots are unable to establish
rapport or communicate emotion.97 Larson and others also emphasize that the
90. SHAROT, supra note 89. Data has limited ability to change minds both because we tend to insulate
ourselves in ìbubblesê and because even once exposed to alternative information, our brains often help
us resist information we do not want to see or hear. Carrie Menkel–Meadow, Why We Can’t -Just All
Get Along+: Dysfunction in the Polity and Conflict Resolution and What We Might Do About It, 2018 J.
DISP. RESOL. 5 (2018).
91. See, e.g., SHAROT, supra note 89, at 48–51; Stark & Frenkel, supra note 86, at 273–74.
92. Needless to say, a full discussion of effective communication and persuasion exceeds the scope of
this Article. For more on this topic, see ROBBENNOLT&STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 491 (discussing
psychology of communication, persuasion, and counseling).
93. Id.
94. See Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political
Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303, 323 (2010) (reporting experimental findings where attempts at
correcting misconceptions failed and, at times, strengthened those misperceptions).
95. See Nyhan & Reifler, supra note 94; see also Christopher A. Bail et al., Exposure to Opposing
Views on Social Media Can Increase Political Polarization, 115 PROC. NATLACAD. U.S. 9216, 9216–
17 (2018) (finding individuals intensified their political views after being exposed to Twitter bots from
the opposing party).
96. Larson, supra note 36, at 108–10.
97. Id. at 113, 135–47; see also Daniel Kane, Robot Learns to Smile & Frown, UNIV.OFCAL.AT SAN
DIEGO NEWS CTR. (July 9, 2009), https://ucsdnews.ucsd.edu/archive/newsrel/science/07-09Robot.asp
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younger generation may be more comfortable than older persons in establishing
meaningful relationships online, or with robots or avatars.98 Perhaps Professor
Larson is right in the long term, but we will only get to such a world if we focus on
human psychology. I, for one, think we have quite a way to go before most of us
will build relationships as effectively with robots or computers as we might with
trained and talented humans. Exploring this possibility, however, requires that we
do empirical research rather than rely on our instincts, and we need to appreciate
that the research must be updated to reflect changing attitudes towards robots and
artificial intelligence.
B. Human Wants
1. The Psychology of Human Wants
ODR often uses what Robert Condlin has called the ìlittle boxesê format.99 In
this type of ODR disputants employ software that helps them check boxes
describing their claim or defense and provide brief narratives to give additional
details. This approach has its pros and cons from a communication perspective, as
will be discussed infra.100 Here, my focus is on two critical aspects of human wants:
(1) Do humans really ìknowê what they want or would be willing to provide? (2)
How easily can we predict what humans might want or be willing to provide? Both
issues are important because box–checking generally requires disputants to state
what they want, and box–creation requires system designers to predict what humans
might want or be willing to give.
At first glance, it might seem very reasonable to assume that disputants know
what they want. An economist might say that ODR presumes wants are
ìexogenous,ê or predetermined.101 Given such a premise, it seems sensible to set
up a system that asks claimants what they want, asks respondents what they are
willing to provide, and then uses technology to bridge the gap either through
adjudication or negotiation. But what if human psychology is such that an
individual who has purportedly suffered harm does not really ìknowê what they
want to do in response to that harm, at least in any meaningful sense of the word?
And what if a person against whom a claim is made does not really ìknowê how
they want to respond? It turns out that what people ìwantê or are willing to provide
may depend on numerous factors, including what they learn about how other
(describing an Einstein robot that ìhas learned to smile and make facial expressions through a process
of self–guided learning.ê).
98. David A. Larson, Online Dispute Resolution: Do You Know Where Your Children Are?, 19
NEGOT. J. 199, 199 (2003) (pointing out that ìour children already have developed effective online
relational behaviors and can establish trust and intimacy online.ê); Noam Ebner, Online Dispute
Resolution and Interpersonal Trust, in ODR: THEORY & PRACTICE 234, 248 (Mohammed S. Abdel
Wahab, Ethan Katsh, & Daniel Rainey eds., 2012) (suggesting that people will trust online
communications more as they become more familiar with the technology).
99. See Condlin, supra note 5, at 734–36. Once disputants have set out their positions using the ìlittle
boxes,ê ODR can either adjudicate the dispute or try to help disputants work out a settlement.
100. Id. at 718–19.
101. See Lars Udéhn, Economics, Exogenous Factors and Interdisciplinary Research, 25 INTL SOC.
SCI. 259, 261 (1986) (ìA first way in which economics treats its exogenous variables is to accept them
as given . . . Among the givens of economics are usually recognized such things as the wants, tastes and
valuations of individuals, . . . the legal framework and the institutional setting in which economic activity
takes place.ê).
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disputants or advisors view the dispute;102 how they come to understand their legal
rights and obligations;103 how they understand the consequences and costs of
seeking or resisting various kinds of relief;104 and how other aspects of the dispute
are resolved.105 Furthermore, ìwantsê may well change over time as disputants
change their minds, as circumstances change, and as options are framed
differently.106
It is also not easy to predict how people may respond to adverse circumstances.
Some people prefer to ìlump itê or ìsuck it upê when bad things happen, whereas
others are much more demanding.107 Accordingly, when claims are asserted, it
would be a mistake to assume that most people focus primarily on material things,
such as financial compensation for past harms, as people may (and often do) have
more future–oriented concerns.108 Additionally, many people care not only about
ìdistributiveê justice and substantive fairnessîwho gets what and whyîbut also
about ìproceduralê justiceîbeing able to tell their story to someone they perceive
as neutral.109 Many people may also care about justice in a more communal sense,
102. Tamara Relis, Civil Litigation from Litigants’ Perspectives: What We Know and What We Don’t
Know About the Litigation Experience of Individual Litigants, 25 STUD. L. POL. & SOCY 151, 162
(2002) (reviewing how lawyers ìconstruct new meanings and explanationsê for the litigants dispute,
reshaping the litigants narrative).
103. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to What?, 148 DAEDALUS 49 (2019) (noting that many
people do not seek legal assistance because they do not realize that the law is relevant to their problem);
see also Relis, supra note 102, at 159 (ì[M]ost litigants get persuaded [by their lawyers] not to expect
too much from the legal process and not to unrealistically demand things in terms of rights, financial
entitlements, and emotional and moral vindication.ê); ROBBENNOLT& STERNLIGHT, supra note 109, at
225–27 (ì[O]ne of an attorneys most important functions is to serve as a voice of reason, telling clients
when they are being unrealistic about their likelihood of success in their pursuits and saying no when
appropriate.ê).
104. Costs can include negative impacts on ones personal life, such as increased stress, harm to ones
sleep patterns, damage to ones work life, and increased depression. Relis, supra note 102, at 187–90.
Additionally, it has been found that ìeven small claims litigants suffered devastating effects on their
lives, including drastic social and personal repercussions, and years of incessant severe worry and
anxiety just thinking about, fearing and preparing for court.ê Id. at 189.
105. See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394–
404 (1978) (arguing that ìpolycentricê problems in which issues are intertwined may be better handled
through negotiations than through adjudication).
106. See ROBBENOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 88–92; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Choice, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 341–42 (1984). At the same time, while people
readily change their minds as to their wants, they often are not aware that they have changed their
position. Michael B. Wolfe & Todd J. Williams, Poor Metacognitive Awareness of Belief Change, 71
Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1898, 1908 (2017).
107. SeeWilliam L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation
of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 L. & SOCY REV. 631, 633–37 (1981) (explaining that not
all persons who perceive they were injured will choose to assert claims, and that perceived injurious
events, grievances, and disputes are all ìsubjective, unstable, reactive, complicated and incomplete,ê
meaning individuals perceptions of events varies and is transformed by subsequent events and
conversations with a variety of persons).
108. Id. at 643. Carrie Menkel–Meadow has written about this issue eloquently in discussing the claims
of women who were injured by the intra–uterine device known as the Dalkon Shield. She explains that
while their claims were joined together, individual women had very different reactions and ìwantsê
based on the physical and mental harms they had endured or anticipated. Carrie Menkel–Meadow,
Taking the Mass Out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on Alternative Dispute
Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender and Process, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 515–16, 531 (1998).
109. See ROBBENNOLT&STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 171–85; see also Ayelet Sela, Can Computers
be Fair? How Automated and HumanæPowered Online Dispute Resolution Affect Procedural Justice in
Mediation and Arbitration, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 91 (2018) (reporting the results of an
empirical study showing that, at least in one context, people felt they received more procedural justice
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either seeking retribution or perhaps obtaining an apology or in–kind relief that
might help to restore justice.110
In case this sounds too abstract, let me use an example to explain what I mean.
Imagine Pamela was fired from her job as a manager at Darbys Restaurant. One
day, Pamela came to work and was told she did not have a job anymore. She was
escorted off the premises by security. Pamela does not really know why she was
fired, and she certainly does not know why she was treated (in her view) so shabbily
by Darby, with whom she thought she had a pretty good relationship. She knows
that she worked as a manager at Darbys for four years. She knows Darby recently
told her that she was too disorganized and sometimes rude to customers. She knows
she is a Latina. She knows she is forty–seven years old. She believes she was a
good manager; she received performance evaluations that she thought were largely
positive, although everyone can improve. She is very upset she was fired. She
needs her job to support herself. She is not sure how long it may take to get another
job.
So, what does Pamela ìbelieve,ê and what does she ìwant?ê Initially, perhaps,
Pamela believes her termination was totally unfair and likely illegal. She suspects
she may have been fired, at least in part, for a discriminatory reason. What else
could it have been when she is basically a good employee? As for ìwants,ê perhaps
Pamela basically wants to roll time back and to not have been fired, but that is an
impossibility. Maybe she wants to better understand what happened, to get more
information from Darby, or hear him apologize. Or maybe she wants to express her
emotions regarding what happened. Or does she just want to get another job and
move on with her life? Does she even want to bring a claim? The truth is, Pamela
herself does not know what she ìwantsê in any true sense. Whatever her wants may
be initially, they will likely change as she talks to more people and learns more
about the circumstances of her termination and her legal options.
In short, although a law school hypothetical might describe a set of events and
state that Plaintiff wants $50,000 and an apology, and that Defendant is willing to
provide $25,000 and a job, this is not how the real world typically works, at least
for most disputes. Unlike Star Treks Mr. Spock111 or IBMs Watson computer,112
humans do not usually come into a dispute programmed with this information. Real
life disputants are not the same as what Professor Kate Kruse has called the
ìcardboard clientsê of law school hypotheticals.113 What does all of this mean for
dispute resolution in general, and for ODR in particular?
2. How Flexible Human -Wants+ Impact Dispute Resolution
The fact that disputants may not have a fixed, predetermined view of what they
want or what they are willing to provide has significant implications for
from automated systems than from humans but recognizing these results may have reflected limited
expectations in automated settings).
110. Id.
111. STAR TREK: THE MOTION PICTURE (Paramount Pictures 1979); see also STAR TREK,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Star-Trek-series-1966-1969#ref12632
48 (last visited June 9, 2019).
112. Watson Anywhere, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/watson (last visited June 9, 2019).
113. Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103,
103 (2010).
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adjudicative and non–adjudicative dispute resolution, including ODR. Both human
and non–human adjudicators must rely on disputants to set out their claims and
defenses. Human adjudicators can at least potentially recognize that disputants
wants will vary, appreciate that a claimants wants may change, and ask disputants
to think more deeply about what they want. It is likely harder, though maybe not
impossible, for a computer or other technology to engage in this sort of interchange.
ODR designers should try to consider the fact that disputantswants may be flexible
and undetermined. Rather than keep disputants locked into initial positions, they
can try to design a process that allows disputants to adjust their demands and offers
before the adjudicator makes a decision. Moreover, it is critical not to assume that
all persons who have been affected by a particular situation will necessarily have
the same wants or demands. Building this kind of creativity and flexibility into
online adjudication will be difficult.
In response to this argument, ODR advocates may suggest that computers
should sidestep human wants and instead adjudicate disputes by resolving all
disputes of a certain type in the same way. If a product arrived broken, replace it;
if there is a car accident, pay the bills; if a person is fired, give them compensation;
if a couple divorces, here is the custody and child support arrangement. However,
while this may sound good in theory, it is difficult to imagine that such a system
could really work fairly, justly, or sensibly in most situations. How would such a
system take into account comparative fault, causation, defenses, or specific facts?
Few, if any, disputes are so cut and dry that most of us can contemplate ceding all
judgment and discretion to a computer.114 Furthermore, such a system may not
provide disputants with the procedural justice many may crave.115
The malleability and unpredictability of human wants is even more important
as one considers non–adjudicative processes. Human mediators (and therapists,
lawyers, and friends) are experts at helping disputants rethink what they want and
are willing to provide. Whether by asking good questions, encouraging disputants
to share their perspectives, providing brainstorming opportunities, offering legal
information, making alternative suggestions, or providing evaluations, humans can
help disputants change their positions. As was discussed with perception and
memory, humans ability to connect through empathy, emotion, and rapport can be
very useful in helping one another rethink and adjust. In addition, humanmediators
are trained to provide disputants with procedural justice, so disputants are at least
satisfied they have been heard by a neutral party.116
I suggest that computers are not likely the best tool for helping humans think
through how they want to respond to a dispute or creatively work things out with a
fellow disputant. ODR advocates may again counter that a computer can be
programmed to help disputants refine and rethink their wants, and then move on to
resolve their issues through negotiation. Certainly, it is true that computers can
provide some help in this regard. Many ODR systems or proposals use computers
to provide disputants with legal information so they can better think about their
options.117 A computer can also run predictive analytics as to whether certain types
114. See Condlin, supra note 5, at 723–24.
115. Id. at 756–57.
116. See generally Nancy Welsh, Do You Believe in Magic?: Self Determination and Procedural
Justice Meet Inequality in CourtæConnected Mediation, 70 SMU L. REV. 721 (2017) (arguing that, in
reality, the hope that mediation would provide procedural justice is not always fulfilled).
117. See, e.g., Carrel & Ebner, supra note 9, at 33; Larson, supra note 4, at 83–89.
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of claims or defenses are likely to prevail.118 A computer might even be
programmed to give prompts or ask certain questions to encourage disputants to
rethink their positions: ìHave you thought about how your proposed custody
arrangement would affect your child?ê or, ìHave you considered how firing your
employee might affect workplace morale?ê or, ìHow do you think your opponent
might view this situation?ê In the Netherlands, a collaborative public–private
partnership apparently made substantial strides towards setting up a system to
resolve family disputes online before being shelved, at least temporarily, due to
funding issues.119 Maybe, surprisingly to some, computers can even provide a
version of procedural justice that is as good or better than that provided by some
humans.120
Yet, while I agree that computers programmed questions may potentially help
disputants think about their positions, my instinct is that computers are not likely to
be as capable of encouraging humans to rethink their positions and interests as
would humans, who can more easily create a relationship involving rapport, trust,
and empathy.121 Additionally, good dispute resolution ideally draws on creativity
and originality. Because disputants do not necessarily see the world in the same
way as other similarly situated disputants, a solution that has worked well for
previous disputants may not necessarily be best for a new set of disputants.
Creativity can help find new financial solutions, new forms of apology, new non–
monetary solutions, and so on. Perhaps one day, computers will be able to generate
creative alternatives.122 David Larson has probably come the closest to imagining
such a world.123 The question of whether artificial intelligence can be creative is
now being hotly debated in a variety of technical contexts.124 But at least today, it
seems more likely that humans, rather than computers, will be able to make the
jump to new solutions and connect disparate ideas in the legal setting.
Many of us have the sense that while computerized dispute resolution works
fairly well for many disputes involving small online purchases, it may be less well
118. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, TOMORROWS LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE
53–54 (2017).
119. See Roger Smith, Goodbye Rechtwijzer: Hello, Justice42, LAW, TECH. & ACCESS TO JUSTICE
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://law-tech-a2j.org/advice/goodbye-rechtwijzer-hello-justice42/; see also Roger
Smith, The Fate of Rechtwijzer’s English Daughter: Relate Suspends Online Family Dispute Resolution
Project, LAW, TECH. & ACCESS TO JUSTICE (Sept. 28, 2017), https://law-tech-a2j.org/odr/rechtwijzers-
english-daughter-relate-suspends-online-family-dispute-resolution-project/. For a discussion of why, in
the perspective of one of its founders, Rechtwijzer failed, see Roger Smith, Rechtwijzer: Why Online
Supported Dispute Resolution is Hard to Implement, LAW, TECH. & ACCESS TO JUSTICE (June 20, 2017),
https://law-tech-a2j.org/odr/rechtwijzer-why-online-supported-dispute-resolution-is-hard-to-implement
/.
120. Sela, supra note 109; see also Nancy A. Welsh, ODR: A Time for Celebration and the Embrace
of Procedural Safeguards, ADRHUB.COM (July 4, 2016), http://www.adrhub.com/profiles/blogs/proced
ural-justice-in-odr (suggesting that ODR advocates and system designers ìembrace the procedural
safeguards that will help your processes to achieve the potential you imagine.ê).
121. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 116; see also Nancy A. Welsh, Magistrate Judges, Settlement and
Procedural Justice, 16 NEV. L.J. 983 (2016) (arguing for structural changes to allow magistrate judges
to provide more procedural justice to disputants in settlement conferences).
122. See Susskind, supra note 118, at 54 (arguing that by using machine learning techniques to analyze
ìthe work of regulators, we may be able to predict compliance outcomes in entirely novel ways.ê).
123. Larson, supra note 31.
124. See, e.g., Sarvasv Kulpati, Can AI Be Creative?: A Comprehensive Look at the State of Computers
& Creativity, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (July 28, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/can-ai-be-creative-
2f84c5c73dca (observing that a computer came up with the idea that robots could walk without using
their legs, but concluding that AI is the ìpaintbrushê for human creativity).
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suited for disputes involving family issues, employment, or complex business
transactions. The psychology of ìwantsê helps us understand this instinct, as well
as determine which disputes are most suitable for ODR and how ODR can be better
designed. It is not so much that fewer dollars are involved with the online dispute
but, rather, that the ìwantsê are simpler and more predictable in online purchases
gone wrong. When a toy arrives broken, it is quite likely that the purchaser wants
either a new toy or a refund, and it is also likely that the seller is willing to
accommodate the buyer, so long as the buyer is not a frequent abuser of the system
and the product was not too expensive. By contrast, when a marriage or
employment relationship has gone awry, or when a business deal has derailed, it is
much harder to predict how disputants might see the world, how they might want
to resolve the dispute, how they might think their adversary sees the dispute, or how
a resolution might be reached. Human dispute resolvers would seem to have a
comparative advantage in these situations.
Yet, I am not suggesting that we should abandon the idea of using ODR for
these kinds of disputes, but only that we ought to study this question empirically to
determine whether my instinct is correct. If I am right that humans currently have
a comparative advantage over computers in creating the kind of relationship in
which disputants can rethink their positions and receive procedural justice, then this
should impact both which disputes we assign to ODR and how we try to design
ODR processes to better handle such situations.
C. Human Communication
1. The Psychology of Human Communication
Human communication is very rich. Unlike computers, that can easily be
networked to transmit information through unambiguous numbers, human
communicators ìrely on a jumble of information gleaned from inference, social
convention, memory, body language, and shared knowledge, as well as from the
relevant verbal or written expressions.ê125 Nonverbal communication, in particular,
speaks volumes. Through our body language, facial expressions, and tone of voice,
we communicate enthusiasm or boredom, confidence or skepticism, sympathy or
disinterest, and much more. While our nonverbals can reinforce our spoken or
written words, they can also contradict them at times or reveal that there is more to
the story than we may be expressing. Poker players and good negotiators are
experts at reading these ìtells.ê126 We can use nonverbal communication to obtain
or express information and to convey emotion or build or disrupt trust and
rapport.127
At the same time, human communication is also very challenging and offers
many opportunities for confusion and misunderstanding. What one person intends,
says, or means is often (maybe usually) not what another person sees, hears, or
125. ROBBENNOLT& STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 142.
126. See generally Joseph Asher, Russell Korobkin, Jack Binion, Howard Lederer, & Annie Duke,
How to Play Your Hand: Lessons for Negotiators from Poker, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 231 (2011)
(containing a transcript of authors symposium contributions).
127. Aimee L. Drolet & Michael W. Morris, Rapport in Conflict Resolution: Accounting for How
Nonverbal Exchange Fosters Coordination on Mutually Beneficial Settlements to Mixed Motive
Conflicts, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 26, 46 (2000).
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understands. For one thing, we often fail to recognize that we have information that
others lack. Things that are obvious to us may not be obvious to others.128 Yet, we
often do not realize that we have been misunderstood. Even when we seemingly
keep our communications simple, such as when we exchange text messages or
emails, opportunities for misunderstanding are rampant.129
Human psychology creates some additional logistical challenges for
communication. For example, humans may be shy, longwinded, angry, or
inarticulate. These and many other mental states may make it difficult for humans
to express what they are thinking in a way that can be well understood by others.130
Additionally, cultural differences in communication style are quite significant. Not
only may the meaning of word usage and gestures differ, but various cultures also
attribute different meaning and significance to silence, disagreement, and broader
context.131 Low–context cultures tend to focus much more on the meaning of
specific words, whereas high–context communication is more indirect and
dependent on relationships and circumstances between the parties.132
2. How Communication Impacts Dispute Resolution
The complexities of human communication have significant implications for
both online and off–line dispute resolution. On one hand, in some ways computers
and technology may be able to ease human communication difficulties. Computers
can facilitate speedy, low–cost exchanges of information between people or entities,
even if they are located far away from one another.133 In our increasingly high–tech
society, some people may prefer the anonymity and ease of written communication
to having to face one another or talk on the phone.134 ODR can feed this
expectation.135 Computers can also aid parties who might be inarticulate, shy, or
disorganized when exchanging their information.136 Such exchanges may involve
basic complaints and responses but may also include photos, documents, or even
128. Psychologists call this phenomenon the ìcurse of knowledge.ê See Raymond S. Nickerson, How
We KnowîAnd Sometimes MisjudgeîWhat Others Know: Imputing One’s Own Knowledge to Others,
125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 737, 750 (1999).
129. See, e.g., Nicholas Epley & Justin Kruger, When What You Type Isn’t What They Read: The
Perseverance of Stereotypes and Expectancies over EæMail, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 414,
415 (2005).
130. See, e.g., Guido Hertel et al., Do Shy People Prefer to Send EæMail? Personality Effects on
Communication Media Preferences in Threatening and Nonæthreatening Situations, 39 SOC. PSYCHOL.
231, 240–41 (2008).
131. RICHARD D. LEWIS, WHENCULTURESCOLLIDE: LEADINGACROSS CULTURES (4th ed. 2018).
132. ROBBENNOLT& STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 152.
133. These exchanges can take place contemporaneously or in an asynchronous fashion. Some of the
best known ODR systems were devised to handle complaints that arose out of online transactions
pertaining to e–commerce such as through eBay or PayPal. Colin Rule, Quantifying the Economic
Benefits of Effective Redress: Large EæCommerce Data Sets and the CostæBenefit Case for Investing in
Dispute Resolution, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 767, 767 (2012).
134. See, e.g., Lauren Newell, Rebooting Empathy for the Digital Generation Lawyer, 34 OHIO ST. J.
ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 4 (2019).
135. Schmitz & Rule, supra note 4, at 122.
136. For example, an ODR program in Utah helps landlords and tenants exchange information that may
help avoid evictions that would otherwise occur when communication fails. See Art Raymond, BYU
LawX Lab Launches Free, Online LandlordæTenant Mediation Tool, DESERET NEWS (July 4, 2019),
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/900078187/byu-lawx-lab-hello-landlord-tenant-mediation-tool.ht
ml.
No. 1] Pouring a Little Psychological Cold Water on ODR 21
live Skype or FaceTime communications.137 By asking certain questions and giving
disputants pre–fabricated ways to describe their disputes, computers can help
disputants organize their issues in an analytical fashion, consistent with legal
categories.138
However, many online approaches to dispute resolution are very limited, from
a communication perspective. To the extent that ODR relies on asking disputants
to check off specific boxes and exchange limited textual information,139 disputants
will not be able to either communicate a broad range of beliefs and concerns nor
learn much about fellow disputants concerns, emotions, or states of mind. Mere
textual communications will also make it extremely difficult for disputants to use
their communications to build trust or rapport. Typing ìtrust meê or ìplease believe
meê may be heartfelt, but has significant limits, as we have likely all experienced.
Even videoconferencing, the richest form of online communication, lacks many of
the nuances of in–person communication. There is no possibility for touch,
visibility is limited, and even the audio is often imperfect.140
None of this means that we should abandon ODR. Rather, we should focus on
the psychological aspects of communication and take them into account when
deciding whether and when ODR makes sense and how it should be structured.
Rich communication will be more important for some kinds of disputes and some
disputants than others. Perhaps ODR text communications will be sufficient for
many (but likely not all) issues that arise out of small internet business transactions.
By contrast, when rich communication is important, text boxes may well prove to
be insufficient. Moving forward, however, we should empirically test our instincts
and try to figure out which kind of communication is best for which circumstances.
D. Judgment and DecisionæMaking
1. The Psychology of Human Judgment and DecisionæMaking
Human psychology also plays an important role in how we make judgments
and decisions. This psychology can impact both disputants and neutrals. In
particular, researchers have found that we are not always the rational profit
maximizers hypothesized by traditional economists.141 Instead, we draw on
emotion, are easily impacted by many kinds of persuasion, and rely on heuristics or
shortcuts that may sometimes lead us to erroneous conclusions.142 Indeed, emotions
are so important to us that when we are deprived of emotion and ìgutê intuition we
137. See, e.g., Gary Marchant & Josh Covey, RoboæLawyers: Your New Best Friend or Your Worst
Nightmare?, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/publications/litig
ation_journal/2018-19/fall/robolawyers/ (enumerating many lawyering tasks at which computers excel).
138. Condlin, supra note 5, at 734–38.
139. Id.
140. 3 Disadvantages of Video Conferencing You Should Know About, EZTALKS (Mar. 23, 2017),
https://www.eztalks.com/video-conference/disadvantages-of-video-conferencing.html (discussing that,
among other things, poor audio quality and audio delay may negatively impact video conferences).
141. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1998).
142. See ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 67–113 (chapters on judgment & decision
making).
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may not be able to make decisions at all.143 Nobel prize winner Daniel Kahneman
famously catalogued many of the heuristics upon which we draw in his book
ìThinking Fast and Slow,ê144 as well as in a series of important articles.145
While I prefer to call our judgment ìhumanê rather than ìirrationalê or
ìbiased,ê there is no doubt that it can sometimes lead us to erroneous conclusions.146
For example, we have a tendency to make assessments consistent with our own
point of view or interests and to overestimate our own role and importance.147
Along these lines, we often think we do more than our share of the work and view
our contributions in an overly positive light.148 Similarly, we tend to be overly
optimistic and overestimate our likelihood of prevailing in a dispute.149 In addition,
the ìanchoringê phenomenon may cause us to make estimates that are too high or
too low based on irrelevant values that were presented to us earlier.150 Thus, a
plaintiff or defendant in a dispute may get ìstuckê in a position that is too high or
too low merely because someone initially threw out a very low or very high
number.151 We also tend to be affected by ìhindsight biasê152–thatMondaymorning
quarterback phenomenon that makes us think ìwe knew it would turn out that way
all along.ê153
When we draw on our judgments to make decisions, we are similarly impacted
by our human psychology. We are quite influenced by how decisions are presented,
and by whom. We can often easily be persuaded to take one course of action or
another, for example, by the persuaders likeability, apparent expertise or
trustworthiness, the clarity of their message, and their use of concrete examples,
stories, and two–sided messages.154 In addition, influence techniques can be
powerful when they draw on such factors as reciprocity, consistency, commitment,
143. Id. at 47 (discussing a case study involving surgery on a patients brain which illuminated the
connection between emotions and decision making).
144. See generally DANIELKAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011). One of the first, if not the
first book to apply psychological insights to dispute resolution was: KENNETHARROWET AL., BARRIERS
TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1995). Though it is a great book, I believe it is a mistake to focus only on
ìbarriers,ê as human psychology can sometimes cause people to enter into unwise agreements or prevent
them from entering into desirable agreements.
145. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297 (1992); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A ReferenceæDependent Model, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1039
(1991); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. BUS.
251, 285 (1986); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
146. At the same time, these heuristics usually serve us quite well!
147. ROBBENNOLT&STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 67–83; see also Suzanne Thompson, Illusions of
Control: HowWe Overestimate Our Personal Influence, 8 CURRENTDIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 187,
187 (1999) (discussing the heuristic we utilize that cause us to overestimate our influence and control in
situations, even those that are governed primarily by chance).
148. ROBBENNOLT& STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 71.
149. Id. at 67–83; Jane Goodman–Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict
Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 133, 137 (2010); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Willem A.
Wagenaar, Lawyers’ Predictions of Success, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 437, 437 (1988).
150. ROBBENNOLT& STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 71–72.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 75–76.
153. Other frequently discussed judgment biases include the ìrepresentationê heuristic (basing a
likelihood estimate on the degree to which an event or object is representative of a particular category)
and the ìavailabilityê heuristic (judging the likelihood of an event based on how easily we can recall
similar instances). ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 72–73.
154. Id. at 115–39.
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and liking.155 Our decisions can also be impacted by framing–specifically whether
options are ìframedê as gains or losses.156 We dont like to lose things that we
had,157 and we are reluctant to treat losses as ìsunk,ê even when we should.158
Further, we may view choices less favorably if they are presented by an adversary
(reactive devaluation),159 we will view choices differently depending on whether
they are presented individually or in the context of other options,160 we may favor
options that allow us to postpone our decisions,161 we may favor choices that we
think will help minimize future regret,162 we tend to miscalculate the value and cost
of things that will accrue in the future,163 and so on.
2. How Judgment and DecisionæMaking Impact Dispute Resolution
The human psychology of judgment and decision–making is highly relevant as
we think about the comparative talents of humans and computers to assist in dispute
resolution. On the one hand, if ODR is adjudicative, some have suggested that
computers can be a ìcureê for the ìirrationalê aspects of human judgment and
decision–making.164 Computers will make decisions according to the algorithms
with which they are programmed (by humans). We can instruct a computer to make
determinations based only on information contained in its database, or perhaps from
public databases according to set rules.165 Computers are adept at obtaining
information and reviewing it with lightning speed. Presumably, we will not instruct
the computer to make determinations based on the appearance or accents of
disputants, the order in which arguments are made, or other seemingly irrelevant
factors. Certainly, computers wont be influenced by whether they like or dislike a
disputant, nor by other emotions. Thus, just as a commercial retailer might use
algorithms to decide whether to offer a customer a full refund or replacement item,
so might a court, in theory, have a computer make a determination on whether a
person deserves a tax abatement or how child support or bail should be calculated.166
Such data analysis can also be used to track dispute trends and thus facilitate
155. Id. at 127–31; ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE (5th ed. 2009).
156. ROBBENNOLT& STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 88–92.
157. Id. at 91.
158. Id. at 92.
159. Id. at 96–97.
160. Id. at 92–93.
161. Id. at 101–02.
162. ROBBENNOLT& STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 99–100; Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry:
The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 46 (1999).
163. ROBBENNOLT& STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 241–43.
164. See Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Biases, SSRN 5 (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3300171 (arguing that well–designed algorithms
should be able to avoid cognitive biases of all kinds).
165. Carrel & Ebner, supra note 4, at 14 (discussing that technology is able to not only access
informationîe.g., legal standards, prior verdicts or settlements, or weather or financial dataîquickly
and efficiently, but also analyze that information and pass it on to the user).
166. See, e.g., Tom Simonite, Algorithms Should’ve Made Courts More Fair. What Went Wrong?,
WIRED (Sept. 5, 2019) https://www.wired.com/story/algorithms-shouldve-made-courts-more-fair-what-
went-wrong/. Of course, there might be Constitutional or other issues that would need to be resolved
before such determinations could be assigned to a computer, but that exceeds the scope of this Article.
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creation of new policies.167 In short, computerized adjudicators can provide an ìall
we want are the factsê168 approach to dispute resolution.
All that said, there are also obvious potential drawbacks to using computers as
adjudicators. As computer programmers have noted for years, ìgarbage in, garbage
out.ê169 Thus, if the data made available to the computer is flawed or incomplete,
or if the algorithm itself is biased, the computers decisions will be faulty.
Researchers have found that artificial intelligence can sometimes ìbake inê biases
we would prefer to eliminate.170 Therefore, it is quite conceivable that certain
algorithmic forms of online dispute resolution could potentially be biased against
classes of disputants on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity, age, or other factors.171
Computers will also not be able to make equitable, moral, or reasonableness
determinations other than those that can be programmed in advance.172
Similarly, the psychology of judgment and decision–making reveals that
computers have potential strengths in aiding disputants to reach negotiated
solutions.173 First, to the extent disputants could benefit from being provided with
more and better data, computers can be quite helpful. Computers are adept at both
collecting and distributing data that can potentially help disputants see that they are
being impacted by the various biases and heuristics outlined above. For example,
one reason disputes can be difficult to resolve is that both sides may be overly
optimistic as to their chance of success in court and thus unwilling to compromise
in a settlement.174 A computer could potentially present data to both sides regarding
jury verdicts or settlements in comparable cases, and thus bring parties closer to
resolution. Second, a computer could help disputants evaluate their options more
rationally, moving them away from overreliance on emotion, sunk costs, anchoring,
167. The communications made through computers can also be recorded, allowing for further analysis
of trends and fair resolution of disputes. Katsh & Rule, supra note 1, at 330.
168. Dragnets Sergeant Joe Friday was famous for his focus on the facts in his interrogations. David
Mikkelson, Dragnet -Just the Facts+, SNOPES (Mar. 29, 2002), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/
just-the-facts/.
169. GIGO, TECH. TERMS (Mar. 4, 2015), https://techterms.com/definition/gigo.
170. See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH–TECH TOOLS PROFILE,
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018) (arguing that technology now being used with respect to social
programs is building a digital poorhouse that is both abusive and stigmatizing); FRANK PASQUALE, THE
BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THATCONTROLMONEY AND INFORMATION 9 (2015)
(expressing concern that algorithmic decision–making may both incorporate discrimination and also
make that discrimination difficult to identify); Pauline Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination,
166 U. PA. L. REV. 189, 202 (2017); Amy J. Schmitz, Expanding Access to Remedies Through EæCourt
Initiatives, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 89, 101 (2019) (urging courts to use great care in relying on algorithms and
artificial intelligence). But see Sunstein, supra note 164 (arguing that well–designed algorithms should
be able to avoid cognitive biases of all kinds); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 1023, 1025 (2017) (suggesting that ìalgorithmic affirmative actionê can be used to remedy
algorithmic discrimination).
171. See, e.g., KATSH& RABINOVICH–EINY, supra note 8, at 49–50 (recounting an incident in which a
Microsoft chatbot programmed for ìlightê conversation began to make offensive comments such as
ìfeminism is cancer.ê). It is also possible that the online dispute resolution will be less biased than a
human third party might be. Id.
172. Condlin, supra note 5, at 723.
173. KATSH & RULE, supra note 8, at 330–31 (asserting that ODR processes can provide a
technological ìFourth Partyê to ìreplace the human third party by helping the parties identify common
interests and mutually acceptable outcomesê drawing on convenience, expertise, and trust afforded by
ODR systems).
174. Alternatively, in a transactional setting, a seller may believe they could get a better price from
other buyers, or a buyer may believe they could get a better or cheaper product from other sellers.
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or miscalculations as to the value of future benefit or costs.175 Third, computers
could help with the issue of reactive devaluation, which sometimes leads both sides
to reject reasonable agreements presented by an opponent. Specifically, a computer
could present a potential solution as the computers proposal. Presumably, parties
would be less skeptical of and thus less likely to reject a computer proposal than a
proposal authored by an opponent.176
Computers can also potentially help disputants reject ìbadê settlements that do
not serve their best interests. Sometimes, rather than block a ìrationalê settlement
that some might say ought to occur, our human decision making and judgment
heuristics may cause us to enter agreements we should reject.177 For example, our
over–optimism, our fears, our desire to be liked, or our liking of others may cause
us to accept settlement proposals that are not helpful. Computers, by presenting
data, could potentially save disputants from this fate by helping them resist
proposed settlements that do not serve their interests.
However, while it seems clear that computers and ODR can potentially help in
all the ways outlined above, I also believe that humans may often be better than
computers at helping fellow humans deal with judgment and decision–making
issues in negotiations. The mere provision of data will often fail to change peoples
minds precisely because human brains do not process data as a computer would.
Rather, people are very skilled at interpreting new data in the way most favorable
to them.178 So, even if a computer provides data on average settlements or jury
verdicts, a plaintiff might tell herself that her broken leg was worse than the average
broken leg, that she is more likeable than most plaintiffs, that defendant is less
likeable than most defendants, and so on. Or, a defendant similarly may tell herself
that the plaintiffs claim is weaker than the average claim. Also, if a disputant is
impacted by such phenomena as anchoring, sunk costs, or framing,179 the mere
presentation of data may not pull them away from their biased interpretation.
Unlike computers, humans care how information is presented, and by whom.
Thus, it may well be that human mediators, lawyers, or friends are more
effective than computers in helping humans deal with their emotions and other
judgment and decision–making issues. It turns out that humans can be very talented
at helping other humans make judgments and important decisions.180 For example,
a human who is good at reflective listening can potentially defuse anger in a way a
computer might not.181 Or, a human can help another human take a break or refocus
175. Numerous studies have shown that lawyers, as well as lay people, are impacted by judgment and
decision–making heuristics when they try to decide whether a particular settlement would be desirable.
RANDALL KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG: THE POWER OF EFFECTIVE DECISION MAKING FOR
ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS (2010).
176. This seems to be one of the values of mediation, as mediators can invite disputants to consider
various solutions without revealing that the possible solution was offered by an opponent. Jean R.
Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to
Structure Advocacy in a NonæAdversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ONDISP. RESOL. 269–366 (1999).
177. ROBBENNOLT& STERNLIGHT, supra note 53, at 69.
178. Id. at 14–16.
179. Id.
180. See Carrell, supra note 20, at 1160–62.
181. Megan Beck &Barry Libert, The Rise of AIMakes Emotional IntelligenceMore Important, HARV.
BUS. REVIEW (Feb. 15, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/02/the-rise-of-ai-makes-emotional-intelligence-
more-important (discussing that although there are things computers can do better than humans, humans
still have the ability to relate to others, which computers cannot).
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or see that their tentative decision is fueledmore by emotion than logic.182 A person
(mediator or attorney or friend) who is trusted and perceived to be an expert can
clearly and persuasively convey information or data to the disputants. If a trusted
person conveys the very same information that the disputant might have gleaned
from a computer, I believe the odds are greater that the information from the human
source will better help dislodge a disputant from his or her unreasonable position.183
Using their communication skills, people can listen to find out disputants
concerns.184 They can build rapport, not only through their words, but also by using
body language and facial expressions.185 With the help of this rapport, they can
build trust, and thus become quite influential. They can tell persuasive stories.
They can use apt metaphors. In all of these ways and more, people can connect
effectively with other people to help them make judgments and decisions. Just
reading information in a chart, relevant though it may be, is not always going to be
as useful as more human modes of interaction. Once again, we can see that
knowledge of human psychology may be critically important as we decide whether
and when ODR approaches are most useful, and how that ODR should be designed.
And yet, once again, it will be important to test these instincts empirically.
IV. A FAMILYDISPUTE EXAMPLE
If all human brains were like computers, and if all disputes were like law school
hypotheticals, ODR might truly help us resolve all or most disputes. Students in a
family law course might encounter a fact pattern like this:
Wanda and Harry were married in 2003. They have two children; Sonny
is 14 and Deirdre is 10. Wanda works part–time as a security guard and
earns $22,000 per year. Harry designs websites and earns $54,000 per year
(imagine that their prior work history and earnings and any savings and
debts have also been provided). The couple has agreed to joint custody
over the children. They have also agreed that the children should spend
most of their time with Wanda and spend every other weekend and certain
holidays with Harry, but details have yet to be worked out. They disagree
on division of debts and assets and financial support, and that is what
brings them to the court/computer.
With such a neatly categorized dispute, a computer might issue a custody plan
and determine precisely how debts and assets should be divided and who should
pay what financial support. Or, the computer might help Wanda and Harry settle
the dispute themselves by providing data on how issues pertaining to custody,
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Hardeep Singh Anant, Interpersonal CommunicationæA Fresh Look, SSRN 3 (Dec. 8, 2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1520394 (explaining various ways to improve
communication skills, especially by listening in a way that is empathetic, in order to better understand
the speakers point of view).
185. See generally Ajut Kumar Kar, How to Walk Your Talk: Effective Use of Body Language for
Business Professionals, 11 IUP J. SOFT SKILLS 16 (2017) (discussing various aspects of body language
that can assist in building rapport).
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debt/assets, and child support are typically determined in the jurisdiction and by
making inquiries to help Wanda and Harry disclose more relevant information.
In the real world, however, all of the human psychology discussed above, and
more, likely intervenes to make Wanda and Harrys situation a lot more
complicated.186 We see that the psychology of perception, memory, wants,
communication, judgment, and decision all may play a significant role. Wanda is
really mad about the fact that Harry had an affair. While this may not technically
be relevant to debt and asset distribution, perhaps Wanda cannot focus on how to
resolve the financial issues until she gets to tell Harry what she thinks about his
conduct. Or, although the couple has seemingly ìagreedê to joint custody, neither
Harry nor Wanda may know what that means. Once the kids end up spending most
of their time with Wanda, she may decide that joint custody was not such a great
idea after all. Perhaps Harry does not care about getting lots of time with the kids,
but he needs to be sure that Wanda understands his perspective on religion and work
out a plan that everyone can accept for the kids religious training. He believes that
Wanda is not supportive of his religion because she rarely wanted to go to church
with him and the kids. Meanwhile, Wanda is not sure how long she wants to remain
in her job. Harry knows he makes a good living but might want to move to another
city, or even another state. Or maybe not, depending on how Wanda is handling
the religious training.
And then there are the financial issues. Both Wanda and Harry have questions
and confusion regarding outstanding debts, accrued pensions, and future earnings,
as well as legal entitlements. Wanda feels strongly that she should not have to share
her pension but does not truly understand the financial issues. Harry suspects
Wanda may be hiding some relevant information and does not trust her
documentation. Harrys mother has been pushing him to seek as many days with
the kids as possible, but Harry is not sure that would be best given his work
schedule. In the real world, even if a computer issues a determination or seemingly
helps Harry andWanda reach a negotiated resolution, that resolution may fall apart
when the couple comes to realize their situation was a lot more complicated than
they originally thought. Meanwhile, because of the bad feelings between them,
Harry and Wanda may have a very difficult time understanding anything the other
is saying. They may tend to assume the worst about each others offers and
demands.
In a complex situation like this, human interventionîwhether by lawyer,
judge, mediator, or friendîcould be extremely useful to Harry and Wanda.187 A
human could help them realize their perceptions and memories are not perfect and
that there are usually at least two sides to every story. Maybe Wanda will learn
things about Harrys alleged affair that decrease her anger. Perhaps Harry will come
to understand that Wandas approach to his religion is not what he had thought and
feared. Through good communication and analysis, aided by a human, both Harry
and Wanda may start to rethink what they thought they ìwanted.ê Once they gain
a better understanding of how joint custody works, and how it might be applied to
them and their family, they may revise their priorities. Perhaps one or both parents
186. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545, 1581 (1991) (providing many examples of family mediation that illustrate its complexity and
heavy emotional content).
187. It is also true that not all human intervenors will be well qualified to handle these tough issues.
Some could even make the situation worse!
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will think differently about moving or changing jobs. As the couple works through
their various difficult issues and emotions, maybe they will be more forthcoming
with one another and come to trust one another more too. Harry may build up the
nerve to tell his mother that he does not share all of her goals regarding spending
time with the kids. Or maybe before they can resolve any of their issues, Harry or
Wanda or both simply need to tell their story to someone who is a good, empathetic
listener and feel as if their concerns have been heard.
Of course, none of this is guaranteed. It could be that human interaction will
fail and that a successful resolution will elude the couple. Judges sometimes make
bad decisions, and attorneys, mediators, and friends are not always effective at
helping disputants work out their issues. I only suggest that humans are likely to
have the edge at some of these skills, while acknowledging that it will be important
to test this assumption.
V. CONCLUSION
My point is not that off–line, human dispute resolution is necessarily better
than ODR but, rather, that both can have great value, depending on the nature of the
dispute and the psychology relevant to that dispute. While it is often said that ODR
is best for simple, low–value, high volume disputes, that is not what a psychological
focus necessarily suggests. Disputes that do not involve a lot of money can certainly
involve the psychology of perception, memory, changing wants, communication,
judgment, and decision making that at least tentatively may not be best for ODR.
We must also remember that the goal is not to make either/or choices between
ODR and other forms of dispute resolution. Instead, we should seek to determine
when and how to combine various approaches. While it will be hard to draw hard
and fast lines for when ODR will or will not work in light of the complexities of
psychology, the psychological lens is still useful. For example, while we have seen
ODR sometimes work well to resolve disputes regarding low–dollar online
commercial transactions,188 even these conflicts may sometimes benefit from a
more personal touch. Disgruntled customers or sellers may want to convey that
they feel disrespected, factual disparities may be hard to resolve, or algorithms may
fail to capture relevant information or make biased calculations. Or, consider a
dispute between neighbors involving a barking dog or loud music. While one can
imagine an online textual exchange of positions and perspectives might sometimes
be useful, it is also easy to see that such an exchange might fail to capture the
neighbors perspectives and goals and ultimately fail to help them adequately
consider each others views. Stock solutions such as curfews could work to solve
the noise issue, but perhaps mediated conversations might yield better, more
creative ideas. As one begins to consider the potential use of ODR for family
disputes or multi–faceted commercial disputes, it is even easier to see that textual
exchanges or algorithmic solutions might not be adequate to allow disputants to
resolve disputes in a way they find just.
188. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP.
L. REV. 279, 320 (2012) (addressing both benefits and burdens of computer mediated communication
with respect to consumer online economy and concluding that ìthe benefits of CMC outweigh its
drawbacks for consumers seeking to make wise purchases and access remedies when problems arise.ê).
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In sum, when we think about ODR it is crucial that we focus on the psychology
underlying disputesîbut this lens does not yield a simple or single recipe for
success. Instead, I offer four conclusions:
(1) Those who design ODR should pay substantial attention to the psychology
underlying disputes and be conscious that merely using ODR to foster rational
exchanges of information will likely not yield ideal dispute resolution. Many
empirical studies already show that human psychology is critically important to
dispute resolution.
(2) In the short term, my instinct is that humans will often have a comparative
advantage over computers or other technology in handling the psychological
aspects of disputes. I believe humans are likely to be more skilled than technology
at building rapport and trust, as well as helping to persuade people to rethink their
strongly held beliefs.
(3) We should all appreciate that technology is evolving quickly and
potentially will be able to do things we cannot easily imagine today. As ODR
designers work to refine ODR approaches, they should focus on the human and
psychological side of disputes. Perhaps holographic mediators will actually be able
to build better empathy and rapport than many humans?
(4) Rather than trust our instincts regarding the comparative superiority of
humans and technology to handle human psychology, we should test these
approaches empirically. I appreciate that even my own instincts on these fronts
may be wrong.
In sum, I hope that the cold water I have poured on ODR may ultimately help
it flourish where most useful rather than dampen our enthusiasm. By artfully
blending technology and psychology, perhaps we can make further progress
towards justice.
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